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ideolo[w86,jmc]		Soviet conservative ideology

	It is important to understand the ideology of the Soviet
ruling class and its supporters in order to understand what the
Soviet Union is likely to do, what agreements with it are possible,
and how the Soviet Union might be changed for the better.  Curiously,
this ideology, except in peripheral aspects, seems not to have
been the object of scientific study.  Neither the Western experts
on the Soviet Union nor the emigres from the Soviet Union whom
I have asked about the matter have had much to say.  I begin by
defining the problem.

	A substantial fraction, perhaps even a majority, of Soviet
citizens are genuinely indignant at expressions of dissent and are pleased
to see it punished.

	This apparently applies in some of the satellites also.  I
asked a friend who had been imprisoned in East Germany before being
permitted to emigrate (presumably after being ransomed by the West
Germans) whether the officials who interrogated him were just doing
their jobs or were genuinely angry with him.  He said they were
angry, and his wife described the anger they displayed when trying
to persuade her not to follow her husband to West Germany.

	Many liberals and some others take Marxist-Leninist slogans
seriously and suppose that the attitudes express Marxist-Leninist
views.  The emigres are vehement in their denials that anyone in
the Soviet Union takes Marxism seriously.  I think the emigres
are mainly right.  At least they have been able to observe that
Marxist arguments are not often given in private discussions about
what a policy should be.

	We take the view that current Soviet ideology involves a number
of interacting strands.  Here are some of them.

	#. A sense of participation in the Party by its members
and pride in its authority and control of society even when the
member's actual participation in its power is vicarious.  In most
Soviet organizations the party unit has little power and influence
except in maintaining discipline, because the actual party control
of management is exercised by higher levels of the party --- most
often by the bureaucracy of the Central Committee.  A member's
actual influence may be slight, but his participation is the
source of his self-importance.  Therefore, he resents any
challenge to the Party's power, reputation and authority.

	#. Russian nationalism and Soviet nationalism.  Both
exist.  Russians take pride and satisfaction in their empire
over the non-Russian peoples of the Soviet Union, in their
control of the satellites and perhaps in their power and influence
over communist and leftist movements abroad.  Non-Russian Soviet
people are usually denied their own nationalism but are invited
to share in the nationalism of the Soviet Union as a whole.

	#. The remains of Marxism-Leninism.  What these remains
consist of is unclear, but they are important.  What is gone is
mainly the possibility of anyone criticizing the Party decisions
or the decisions of higher authorities on grounds that they don't
conform to Marxism-Leninism.  Nevertheless, many of these decisions
are partially motivated by official ideology, and the fact that
they have to be justified in these terms affects their form and
the processes of their implementation.

	I conjecture that to a degree that is hard to imagine in
the West the real ideology is implicit and is never expressed in
writing or in public speeches, even within the top ruling circles.
Everyone knows the emperor has no clothes, but no-one can dares
say so.  Evidence: Khrushchev's memoirs were written in the same
language as is used officially.  Djilas reports the same language used
in Stalin's circle.
So does Trifunovich, who as Yugoslavian ambassador to Khrushchevian
Moscow, was somewhat of a confidant of Khrushchev.

	There are apparently no secret journals of opinion among
the elite.  Instead foreign commentary plays an extremely important
role.  High officials, above some moderate level, can get translations of
foreign book and periodical literature.  The advantage of foreign
publications is that no Soviet person need take responsibility for the
ideological correctness of their formulations.

	Emigres who have been in quite high positions (I have in mind
the diplomat Shevchenko and General Grigorenko) do not report any
kind of frank discussion of ideological matters --- only discussion
of means --- not of ends.  Of course,  in most organizations, Soviet
or not, most discussion is of means, but in free countries there is
some discussion of ends and it plays an important role.

	Dissidents, when writing about Soviet conservative ideology,
generally take a merely cynical view.  Observing that the officially
expressed ideology is not believed, they assert that the unofficial
ideology of the ruling class is merely selfishness.  That's part of it all
right.  People are inclined to believe what supports their privileges.
However, this doesn't explain the intolerance and indignation with which
they regard dissent or even uncontrolled ideas.  In that, there is
a considerable parallel to the intolerant moralistic ideology
prevalent in America before the first World War.